Ransom v.
[Civ. 20231
Second Dist, Div Three
Dec., 13, 1954]
WALTER RANSOM et al., Appellants, v. THE
LOS ANGELES CITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Respondents.
COUNSEL
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, William
E. Lamoreaux and Clarence H. Langstaff, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondents.
Axelrad & Sevilla for Appellants.
OPINION
SHINN. P. J.
The plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of
dismissal of a taxpayers' suit brought to enjoin the intended dedication of a
right of way by defendant
The plaintiffs, Walter Ransom, Ab Waxman,
William Burroughs, Bernard Jackson, Louise Morehouse, Elyse Byler and Marie
Long are resident taxpayers in
On July 30, 1953, the defendant board, by
resolution, declared its intention to dedicate to the city of
The district acquired this property in
1941, and in 1946 a bond issue was approved and construction of a junior high
school on this site was proposed. Also, in 1946,
Subsequently due notice was given and a
hearing held regarding the dedication and improvement of the boundary streets,
and the same were dedicated and later improved.
The proceedings leading up to this
petition for an injunction began on May 18, 1953, when the council requested
the respondent district to immediately dedicate and improve the 84-foot right
of way and construct a pedestrian tunnel underneath it. On June 11th, the board
advised the council that there were insufficient funds then available to make
the said improvements and asked clarification of the request of May 18th. July
3, 1953, the council requested the district to begin said dedication and
improvement, and stated that 180 days from May 18th would be a reasonable time
for completion. The board, acting pursuant to sections 18671 and 18672 fn. 1
{Page 129 Cal.App.2d 504} of the Education Code, then adopted a resolution
declaring its intent to dedicate the right of way in question, and fixed August
13, 1953 as the date when a public hearing would be held. The filing of the
original complaint on August 7, 1953, seeking a temporary injunction
restraining this intended action was precipitated by board approval on August
3, 1953, of $3,250 for engineering plans for the improvement, and $320 to the
In the complaint the appellants alleged
with considerable elaboration that the intended action of the board would
interfere with teaching, impose a traffic hazard, introduce a flood danger,
impose difficult administrative problems, deprive the school of badly needed
space, introduce new problems of morals, materially depreciate taxpayers'
property and consume school funds needed for school purposes.
The demurrer of the defendants was
sustained without leave to amend and the appellants in this proceeding appeal
from a judgment of dismissal. In substance, the contentions of the appellants
are the following: (1) Sections 18671 and 18004 fn. 2 and related sections of
the Education Code do not authorize the dedication or improvement of property
in a {Page 129 Cal.App.2d 505} manner that would be detrimental to its use for
school purposes; (2) The threatened dedication would constitute an abuse of
discretion on the part of the board; (3) It would constitute a gift of the
money and property of the district in violation of article IV, section 31, and
article IX, section 1, of the state Constitution; (4) It was an abuse of
discretion for the court to refuse the plaintiffs a right to file an amended
and supplemental complaint.
The essence of plaintiffs' argument on the
first and second points is that if the facts alleged in the complaint be taken
as true, it follows that the proposed dedication and improvement of the right
of way were not in furtherance of school purposes, and therefore such action
would be in excess of the powers of the board. [1] The answer to these
contentions is found in the familiar rule that courts will not interfere with
the actions of administrative boards in the absence of fraud, collusion, bad
faith or manifest abuse of discretion. The most that was charged was error of
judgment and the court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative board. The board has broad discretion in determination of the
public interest and benefit to the district from its action and as the court
said in Butler v. Compton Junior College Dist., 77 Cal.App.2d 719, at page 727
[176 P.2d 417], quoting the case of Berkeley High School Dist. v. Coit, 7
Cal.2d 132 [59 P.2d 992]: "... the courts 'cannot enter the board room ...
nor interfere at all with its action unless the board is exceeding its
legislative powers, or its judgment or discretion is being fraudulently or
corruptly exercised.' (Nickerson v. San Bernardino County, 179 Cal. 518 [177 P.
465].)" (See also Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 23 Cal.2d 303,
315 [144 P.2d 4]; Cramer v.
[2] It must be presumed that all the
matters alleged in the complaint which it is claimed would operate to the
detriment of the district were considered by the board before it took its
action and that the dedication and improvement, although entailing some
disadvantages, would be consistent with a proper use of the property for school
purposes.
[3, 4] The third contention of the
appellants that this is a gift of public money or thing of value within the
prohibition of article IV, section 31, of the Constitution, is not well taken.
The section states: "The Legislature shall have no power {Page 129
Cal.App.2d 506} ... to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of
any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other
corporation whatever ..." The public purpose doctrine is a well-settled
test which has been used in determining whether an appropriation comes within
the restriction. The section applies only to the use of public property for
private purposes. If the public property is to be used for public purposes it
does not fall within the section, provided the appropriation will be beneficial
to the entity which is making the appropriation or authorizing its use. These
tests are well stated in the case of City of Oakland v. Garrison, 194 Cal. 298
[228 P. 443], where it was held that an expenditure of county funds for
improving an Oakland city street was for a public purpose and would be
beneficial to the county itself. (See also Sacramento etc. Drainage Dist. v.
Riley, 199
It was necessary for the board to obtain
the consent of the city to the improvement of the site and its use for school
purposes. Certainly it was of benefit to the district that the city give its
consent. The district acquired the right to use the site by complying with the
demands of the city rather than dispose of the property and locate its school
elsewhere. There may have been attendant disadvantages, as alleged by
plaintiffs, but it was for the board and not for the court to say whether these
were outweighed by the advantages. The tests of public purpose and benefit to
the appropriating entity were satisfied. The constitutional prohibitions were
not violated.
[5a] The fourth and last contention of the
appellants that they should have been granted leave to amend and file a
supplemental complaint is not well taken. The demurrer to the original
complaint was argued August 19 and was sustained without leave to amend and a
judgment of dismissal was entered August 26, 1953. On September 11, the
plaintiffs gave notice of a motion to vacate the judgment and permit {Page 129
Cal.App.2d 507} filing of an amended and supplemental complaint. By the
supplemental complaint the plaintiffs made an attack upon the proceedings of
the board had and taken subsequent to the institution of the action, namely, at
the meeting of August 13. It was alleged that August 13, 1953, was fixed as the
time for a public meeting and that the plaintiffs were not allowed a sufficient
time to prepare and present to the board their opposition to the board's
proposed action, namely, a protest signed by at least 10 per cent of the
qualified electors of the district pursuant to section 18675 of the Education
Code which protest would have halted the proceedings unless and until the
proposed dedication received the approval of the superintendent of schools.
[6] The motion to vacate the judgment was
properly denied. The court may not vacate its judgment except under (1) motion
for a new trial, (2) on motion where the conclusions of law are inconsistent
with the findings, or the judgment is inconsistent with the special verdict,
(3) a motion under the provisions of section 473 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, where application is made to set it aside within six months, (4) by
motion therefor at any time where the judgment is void on its face, or (5) by
an independent suit in equity, where the judgment is regular on its face but
extrinsically void for want of jurisdiction or by reason of fraud or mistake.
(Levy v. Brill, 107 Cal.App.2d 204 [236 P.2d 603]; Fisch & Co., Ltd. v.
Superior Court, 6 Cal.App.2d 21, 23 [43 P.2d 855]; Biggs v. Biggs, 103
Cal.App.2d 741, 742 [230 P.2d 32]; Barlow v. City Council of
[5b] The proposed amended and supplemental
complaint failed to state a cause of action. Section 18672 of the Education
Code prescribes that before a dedication of school property be made, a
resolution of intention shall be adopted by two-thirds of the members of the
board describing the property to be dedicated and fixing a time not less than
10 days thereafter for a hearing. Section 18673 provides that notice shall be
given not less than 10 days before the meeting by posting and not less than 5
days by publication. The resolution of the board was adopted July 30, 1953, and
two weeks were allowed for the preparation and presentation of a protest. It
was alleged that the signatures of 33,000 qualified voters were the minimum
number required for an effective protest and that the same could not be
obtained in the allowed time. {Page 129 Cal.App.2d 508}
[7] Although the statute allows a public
hearing after the adoption of the resolution, the "public hearing"
would not be a judicial hearing but merely a mode for ascertaining the public
interest. (Brown v. Board of Supervisors, 124 Cal. 274, 279 [57 P. 82]; Lindell
Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 23 Cal.2d 303, 315, supra.) The board allowed
more than the statutory time for the presentation of protest, and the fact that
it would have been difficult to procure signatures of 10 per cent of the
electors within two weeks' time would not be a ground for invalidating its
action. The proceeding was not one to deprive the plaintiff taxpayers or other
property owners of their property or rights. Appellants have incorrectly
referred to the property as "taxpayers' property," but admit that the
school district holds the property in fee as a trustee for the beneficial
owner, the state.
[8] The Legislature has plenary power as
to school districts, and the school board in authorizing dedication pursuant to
Education Code, sections 18671 to 18675, performs an administrative function as
provided by the Legislature. (Butler v. Compton Junior College Dist., 77
Cal.App.2d 719, supra; Stone v. City of Los Angeles, 114 Cal.App. 192, 204- 205
[299 P. 838].) It is public property that is dedicated and the taxpayers have
no right to be heard in the matter except as the right is given by the statute.
Therefore, being an administrative function, the exercise of which would not
affect the plaintiffs' rights, the action of the board did not come within the constitutional
protection of the due process clause as to notice and hearing. As there is no
right to notice and a hearing except under the statutory provision, the same is
a privilege extended by the Legislature, and appellants cannot be heard to
complain they have been deprived of constitutional rights in violation of
substantive or procedural due process. (Dominguiz Land Corp. v. Daugherty, 196
Cal. 468, 482 [238 P. 697, 44 A.L.R. 1].)
It was alleged in the proposed
supplemental complaint that at the hearing on August 13, evidence was
introduced by the opponents of the proposed dedication which tended to prove
the dedication would impair school operations and prejudice the welfare and the
best interests of the school children. Plaintiffs see only the imperfections in
the plan. Plaintiffs argue that in view of this evidence it was an abuse of
discretion for the board to proceed further in the matter. They overlook the
fact that if the board had not acquiesced in the conditions imposed by the city
there would be no {Page 129 Cal.App.2d 509} school on the property. That,
alone, was sufficient to prove that the dedication would be of real benefit to
the district, despite its disadvantages.
At the time the demurrer was heard, the
board had already held its meeting of August 13. Plaintiffs could then have
amended to challenge the proceedings which they sought to attack by their
amended and supplemental complaint. [5c] The demurrer should not have been
sustained without leave to amend unless it appeared that the complaint could
not be amended to state a cause of action. (Wight v. Hubbard, 111 Cal.App.2d
606 [245 P.2d 64].) Had plaintiffs amended or sought leave to amend in
accordance with the amendment which they proposed later, their complaint would
still have failed to state a cause of action. Therefore, it was not error to
refuse leave to amend.
The judgment is affirmed.
Wood (Parker), J., and Vallee, J.,
concurred.
FN 1 "The governing board of any
school district may, pursuant to this article, dedicate or convey to the State,
or any political subdivision or municipal corporation thereof, for public
street or highway purposes, either with or without consideration and without a
vote of the electors of the district first being taken, any real property
belonging to the district, either in fee or any lesser estate or interest
therein, including abutter's right of access to any public street or highway;
and may dedicate to any public corporation without a vote of the electors of
the district first being taken and with or without consideration, an easement
to lay, construct, maintain, and operate water, sewer, or storm drain pipes or
ditches over and upon any land belonging to the school district."
"Before ordering the dedication or
conveyance of any property the governing board shall in regular open meeting by
a two-thirds vote of all its members adopt a resolution declaring its intention
to dedicate or convey the property. The resolution shall describe the property
proposed to be dedicated or conveyed in such manner as to identify it, and
shall specify the purposes for which and the terms upon which it will be
dedicated or conveyed, and shall fix a time not less than 10 days thereafter
for a public meeting of the governing board to be held at its regular place of
meeting for a public hearing upon the question of making the dedication or
conveyance."
FN 2 "The governing board of any
school district may grade, pave, construct sewers, or otherwise improve streets
and other public places in front of real property owned or controlled by it,
and also may construct in immediate proximity to any school of the district,
pedestrian tunnels, sewers and water pipes when required for school purposes,
and may appropriate money to pay the cost and expense of the improvements,
whether made by the board under contract executed by the board, or under
contracts made in pursuance of any of the general laws of the State respecting
street improvements, or under other contracts made in pursuance of the charter
of any county or municipality."